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Introduction
In October of 1970, Canada stood still as terror and civil unrest directly
challenged the unity of the country. Le Front du Liberation du Québec (FLQ), a
Marxist terrorist group had strayed from their usual tactic of bombings and
robberies to the kidnapping of public officials. Their goal was nothing less than the
overthrow of the Canadian federal government and the establishment of a new
Québécois independent state.
On 5 October 1970, James Cross, trade
commissioner to the British Government, was taken from his residence at
gunpoint. Five days later Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labor in the Liberal
provincial government, was taken from his front lawn by FLQ operatives. What
followed was an intense period of governmental and social maneuvers that changed
the very fabric of Canada and Québec forever.1
The October Crisis is an event that means different things to Francophone
and Anglophone Canadians. For the Francophone community, the October Crisis
still plays an important role in political sub-consciousness. For the rest of Canada,
the Crisis is rarely openly approached or discussed, and when it is, it is a difficult
reminder of the contradictions present in the Canadian national experiment.
English Canadians are introduced to the subject only in whispers and English
scholarship of the October Crisis typically takes a defensive stance over the
implementation of the War Measures Act (or Act). In Francophone scholarship
explorations of the Crisis are mainly concerned with the effects and the injustices
under the Act and typically avoid direct examinations of the actions of the
terrorists. On the whole, the War Measures Act receives a disproportionate amount
of the attention in current scholarship. It is not uncommon for historical
discussions to focus solely on the Act alone, as if the implementation of it existed
on a plane separate from the overall context of the other events that transpired.
Unfortunately, these approaches to the October Crisis fail to advance our
understanding of the event and how it affected the dynamics between two different,
but utterly linked cultures and communities. The realities of geography, time and
space, and an inter-connected late-modern economy do not afford historians the
luxury inquiries defined only in the language of nationalism. While it is very
difficult to examine the October Crisis in the midst of a political debate that is in
essence still occurring, there exists an opening in which to wedge in a new
approach to the event. History could be better served if historians examine the
1

For a more detailed synopsis of the October Crisis see appendix #1. The reader is also referred to
the film Action: The October Crisis, 1970, available at
http://www.nfb.ca/film/action_the_october_crisis_of_1970. Also see CBC Digital Archives.
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-crisis-civil-libertiessuspended.
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subject with new emphasis on objectivity and a set of terms that are not typical of
the current approaches; one that focuses on the rather deep connections that
occurred as a result of the violence.
In draw attention to the daylight between the current camps of
historiography, the examination herein will attempt to ‘get down in the mud’, as it
were, in order to understand how violence 2 was utilized by the FLQ 3 and the
federal government. Within the conversation that the FLQ engaged in with
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Québec Premier Robert Bourassa,
and the respective agencies of the federal and provincial governments, violence
played a central role in the amplification and interpretation of how one entity
interacted with the other. The observers of this violent interaction, the respective
communities of Québec and the rest of Canada were modified by the events as
well.
The October Crisis is an event that plays a very active role in Canadian and
Québécois identity formation. The violence of the event still punctuates the debate
over the powers of government and the exercise of democracy. Therefore, it is
essential that Canadians and Québécois alike re-approach the event now that it is
beginning to fade into our past. As the separation in time and distance begins to
grow, the cultural place of the October Crisis grows clearer. This thesis will reassess
the critical views of the event from both English and French sources in order to
inquire how the event transpired, what were the intentions of the terrorists, how
English and French culture viewed the event, and how the event can be examined
from a culturally neutral position. The primary goal of this thesis is two-fold; firstly,
it seeks to find space for a new historiographical approach, one that will hopefully
reconcile the current dichotomy between French and English sources; and
2

This work accepts that the violence during this time was not solely utilized by the FLQ. The
government of Canada, on both provincial and federal levels engaged in violence against the FLQ
and the wider Canadian population. The powers granted to the federal and provincial governments
under the War Measures Act, such as the suspension of habeas corpus for up to 90 days, arrest without
warrant, seizure of property and the suppression of speech, were acts of violence. By using violence
the federal government engaged directly with the FLQ on their terms. For the purposes of this work,
violence is defined as any action, physical, or mental, that is intended to force the will of one party
upon another. Examples, of this include, but are not limited to, killing, kidnapping, bombing,
robbery, arrest, confinement, deportation, suspension of liberties, threats of aforementioned
actions, and softer forms of violence such as taxation, legislation and general governmental policies.
Violence within the dialogue of the October Crisis is best described in the Clauswitizian terms as
“War [or violence] is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” Clausewitz, Carl von, and
Beatrice Heuser. On War. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13. Emphasis in original.
3
While separate cells of the FLQ operated independently as the crisis transpired, the use of
terrorism by a political movement as a tool of engagement is the primary focus and not in so much
the actions of individuals working in these cells. For the sake of simplicity and brevity the FLQ will
be treated as one entity, as these cells possessed the same common goal and agreed to tactics.
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secondly, this work will apply a new approach to the October crisis in hopes of
breaking new ground. While there is no ignoring the manifested nationalism that
is evident in the conflict between the parties, there is a way to reinterpret the event
by applying new techniques that will reveal new common grounds for exploration
by historians on both sides of the equation.
Literature Review
The historical placement of the October Crisis of 1970 within Canadian
and the Québécois culture is dependent upon more factors than just the provincial
boundaries. Self-described Québécois and Canadians exist in very different cultural
spaces and it is understandable that each population would interpret the October
Crisis differently. Up to this point linguistic barriers have colored most of the
scholarship related to the period. The majority of historical assessments of the
October Crisis do not examine the cultural interactions between Anglophones,
Francophones, and bilingual peoples affected by the incident. Like the continuing
political dispute between a provincial French Québécois identity and an English
Canadian identity, secondary historical interpretations are divided along semipermanent linguistic lines.4 French scholarship tends to interpret the events in
terms of linguistic-rights and Quebec historical legacy, while ignoring the broader
political and social crisis within Quebec and Canada, and areas of potential
agreement. At times, English scholarship tends to ‘Orientalize’5 and downplay the
legitimate agency of the Québec peoples and fails to recognize it own legacy of
colonial attitudes. English scholarship is overwhelmingly preoccupied with
justifying the use of the War Measures Act in response to the Crisis and fails to
properly interpret the meaning of the political violence. Neither of these
approaches fully explains the cultural significance of the October Crisis.6
What is most troubling about the state of current scholarship is the lack of
recognition of a cross-border, cross-lingual common culture, no matter how
minute. The literature fails to directly explore the cross-cultural reshaping that was
taking place and ultimately solidifies the discussion around a national identity
based solely on language and assumed geographic locations. Current provincial
4

See Figure 1 - The Division of Views on the October Crisis. It should be stated that there are of
course exceptions to these tendencies that focus on macro-level issues; however, research has
revealed a paucity of direct examinations in this regard to the October Crisis itself.
5
As defined in Said, Edward W. Orientalism. (New York: Random House, 1979); “My contention is
that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was
weaker than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference with its weakness....As a cultural
apparatus Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-to-truth, and knowledge” (Said, 204).
6
See Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: an insider's view. (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 2007).
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map lines are not adequate to describe the millions of people who live on opposite
sides of that border. While the lingual structures of Canada are constantly
changing, 7 French and English influences have had a lasting impact on both
cultures and populations on both sides of the border. Creolized languages (i.e.
‘fringlish’), cuisine, music, sport and art are in constant exchange both inside and
outside of cultural centers;8 centers such as the cities of Montréal and Ottawa, and
a common northern Ontarian and Québécois culture.
Among the recent attempts at approaching the October Crisis is
Dominique Clément’s The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under the
War Measures Act as published in the Journal of Canadian Studies stands out as an
example of the historiographical conflict that surrounds the October Crisis.
Clément writes that the implementation of the War Measures Act was “responsible,
directly or indirectly, for extensive human right abuses across the country”. 9
Clément describes a situation in which public and political fear was unleashed by
the powers contained in the Act. She outlines the many incidents of government
intervention in the lives of suspected supporters and confirmed supporters of the
FLQ not just in Québec but also throughout Canada. She ultimately concludes
that “the federal government continues to reserve the power to restrict human
rights severely”10 even under the reformed War Measures Act (i.e. the Emergencies
Act) and the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Clément does not recognize the actions of the Quebec provincial
government with regards to the implementation of the War Measures Act. This
omission is curious and fails provide balance to the work. Clément’s work is
critical of federalism and therefore the participation of the provincial Québec
government in the machinations of the October Crisis do not buttress her thesis.11
As well, while arguing against federalism, she invokes a federal cultural connection.
Clément states, “I argue that the crisis was not limited to Quebec and Ottawa… I
suggest that the War Measures Act was responsible, directly or indirectly, for
extensive human rights abuses across the country”. 12 Clément could have
recognized that her critique of the actions of the federal government was an
7

As evidenced in studies such as Kaplan, David H. “Two nations in search of a state: Canada's
ambivalent spatial identities”. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. (1994) Vol. 84.
8
Cultural spaces as described in Dib, K., I. Donaldson, and B. Turcotte. “Integration and Identity
in Canada: The Importance of Multicultural Common Spaces”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2008) 40,
no. 1: 161-188.
9
Clément D. “The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under the War Measures Act”.
Journal of Canadian Studies. (2008) 42, no. 2: 161.
10
Ibid., 178.
11
See Tetley.
12
Clément, 161.
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illustration of a consciousness that crosses the political-linguistic divide. This nonrecognition of a larger narrative is a missed opportunity. Clément could have gone
beyond the simple mechanics of the event and talked about how the October Crisis
joined all Canadians, including the Québécois in a common endeavor, namely the
protection of human rights.
The goal of this thesis is not to target specific historians. However, it is
important to examine specific examples in order to understand why Canadian and
Québécois historiography has not evolved around the October Crisis. It is
approaches like Clément’s that provide the impetus for a new methodology. 13
Canadian and Québécois historiography would be better served by an approach
that can provide answers to what really happened to the cultures of Canada and
Québec during the October Crisis. Typically, as the span of time increases from a
historical event the event is placed in a historical context with greater ease.14 The
tactical considerations of an event become less important and the strategic level
considerations become ascendant. Yet, the October Crisis defies this paradigm and
it is not easily understandable why. The War Measures Act is given the bulk of the
analysis and this is usually done in terms that have more to do with current
political debates than reasoned and dispassionate reflection.
Other broader cultural studies, which are not aimed specifically at the
October Crisis, have attempted to reconcile the conflict between Québec and the
rest of Canada with increasing success. These studies approach the tension from
many useful disciplines, such as political science, psychology, linguistics and more.
Most of these studies focus on the overarching context of a time of social strife and
how the dynamics between Canada and Québec were altered. These studies are
helpful, but macro theories can render micro events irrelevant and can obfuscate
specific instances that could lead to a greater understanding. However, these
indirect cultural approaches provide the framework for a focused discussion into a
specific event, such as the October Crisis.
David Kaplan describes as “Spatial Identities and Spatial Ideologies”15 that
nationalist and linguistic identification of territory is the source of conflict when
those boundaries are undefined. Kaplan’s study is very useful in understanding the
major shifts in populations and thus the political flashpoints of conflict. However,
his paper does not explore the changes in cultural context that these conflicts take
place in and the terms of the culture. The lingual status ignores the other factors
that can illuminate the conflict within the culture. Jan Erk explores the
13

Another example of a War Measures Act focused approach see Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard
Cloutier. Trudeau's Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka
Books, 2010.
14
See Figure 2 - Distance in Time and Historiography, Appendix 1.
15
Kaplan, 585.
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permanency political ideology as related to nationalist positions. Erk posits that
Québec’s left-leaning culture is a result of two synchronized factors: “(1) the critical
juncture during which change occurs, and (2) mechanisms of continuity ensuring
the consistency of the party position”.16 For Erk, the Quiet Revolution and the
Parti Québécois (PQ) form the basis for the Québec sub-nation nationalism. This
model merits further application with regard to the October Crisis and how the
perceptions on the ground were affected. Paul Zanazanian points to the historical
consciousness of Québécois history teachers and rightly observes that “Rather than
transmitting a shared vision of Quebec's past that integrated both Francophone
and Anglophone viewpoints, as well as those of other minority groups, these
initiatives preserved a historical narrative that mostly configured the collective
identity of the Francophone majority”. 17 Zanazanian highlights the lack of a
cohesive cultural narrative and how that affects continued cultural conflict,
something that becomes apparent in the general Québécois response to the Crisis.
Similarly, Sylvia Söderlind in Ghost-National Arguments outlines the problems that
nationalism injects into cultural understanding. She aptly illuminates the
frustrations that cultural consciousness experiences with respect to national
identities. She argues “there is something fundamentally missing when – in an age
when the concept of nation is more than ever at issue – one writes a history in
which ‘nation’ is the structuring principle without mentioning the role Quebec has
played in English-Canadian thinking about nation”.18 Söderlind’s discomfort stems
from the contradiction that nationalistic politics creates. This uneasiness is
especially prevalent with nations as geographically intertwined as Québec and
Canada. Jean-Philippe Warren and Eric Ronis address the links between social
movements and emotion by studying the 1995 Québec unity rally. 19
Complimenting Warren and Ronis is James Cameron and John Berry’s survey of
two thousand Canadians that explores the factors related to the psychological
attachment of nationalism. Cameron and Berry identify the factors related to
“Canadian identity and patriotism”.20 The issues they focus on are “the sources
and structure of patriotism [and] the predictors of patriotism, with a focus on
16

Erk J. “Is Nationalism Left or Right? Critical Junctures in Québécois Nationalism”. Nations and
Nationalism. (2010) 16, no. 3: 423.
17
Zanazanian, Paul. “Historical Consciousness and the ‘French-English’ Divide Among Quebec
History Teachers”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2011) 40, no. 3: 110.
18
Soderlind, Sylvia. “Ghost-National Arguments”. University of Toronto Quarterly. (2006) 75, no. 2:
674.
19
Warren J. P., and Ronis E. “The Politics of Love: The 1995 Montreal Unity Rally and Canadian
Affection”. (2011) Journal of Canadian Studies. 45, no. 1: 5-32.
20
Cameron, James E., and John W. Berry. “True Patriot Love: Structure and Predictors of Canadian
Pride”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2011) 40, no. 3: 18
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whether various sources of diversity (e.g., region, ethnicity) have a bearing on
Canadian national pride”. 21 The data is useful for understanding the modus
operandi of nationalism in the Canadian/Québécois dynamic. Hudson Meadwell
explores the Québec nationalism movement and its unique ability to mobilize
support for political change. 22 His exploration is useful to understanding the
political interactions between the Québec and Canadian governments and the
political support for the PQ. Meadwell’s analysis downplays the impact of class
economics and suggests that “the problem of economic viability provides a
compelling interpretation”23 of Québec’s political mobilization.
Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton posit that “factors other than
independence account for the PQ electoral success in 1976 and that the
independence issue limited, rather than increased, the recruitment of new mass
support”.24 Their theory illustrates the political reasoning behind issue voting and
applies their research to the 1976 election in which the PQ came to power on a
platform of independence. They note that “for many Quebec voters, independence
was not even an immediate issue in 1976”. 25 Thus, the political expressions of
independence were not even aligned with the desires of the population. Their
research raises questions about how political and cultural expressions associated
with independence are linked.
Brad Kent offers a comparative analysis of positions adopted by leaders in
two divided states: Ireland and Canada. Irish publisher Sean O’Faolain and
Canada’s Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau are held up for comparison in relation to
their critiques of the role that nationalism plays in the politics in their respective
countries. Kent states that O’Faolain attempted to convince the Irish politicians
that local nationalistic concerns are single-minded and damaging to the interests of
their people.26 Likewise, Kent describes Trudeau’s criticism of nationalism in terms
of the Quiet Revolution and the required social reforms, “French Canadian
nationalists and the church had created a culture of fear in which the people had
come to believe that they were under siege, attacked on all sides by free thinkers,
Anglo-Canadians, Jews, imperialists, and communists”.27 Kent showcases Trudeau
21

Ibid., 18-19.
Meadwell, Hudson. “The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec”. World Politics. (1993) 45, no. 2: 204.
23
Meadwell, 241.
24
Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton. “The Parti Québécois Comes to Power: An Analysis of
the 1976 Quebec Election”. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science
Politique. (1978) 11, no. 4: 740.
25
Ibid., 741.
26
Kent, Brad. “Sean O'Faolain and Pierre Elliott Trudeau's Midcentury Critiques of Nationalism”.
New Hibernia Review. (2008) 12, no. 1: 128.
27
Ibid., 139.

22
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as a leftist leader that rejects Québec nationalism and favors much-needed social
reform, who then has the issue turned around on him, finding himself on the
other side of nationalism and painted as a conservative by his rivals. Kent
concludes his article by aligning Trudeau with Frantz Fanon and “Like Fanon,
Trudeau viewed nationalism as but a step on the road to full liberation. Trudeau
was therefore critical of nationalism’s tendency to be abused as a tool of bourgeois
hegemonic rule. As a lawyer and a socialist, his approach was a blend of
constitutional reform and Marxist thought voiced through a socio-economic
critique”. 28 Kent therefore discredits the much held onto pairing of Québec
nationalism and leftist social policies. By creating doubt as to the sincerities of
Québec sovereignty, Kent opens up discussion on whether or not it was done in the
spirit of the Quiet Revolution cultural and social objectives.29
28

Ibid., 144.
Other useful studies include Auger, Martin F. “On the Brink of Civil War: The Canadian
Government and the Suppression of the 1918 Quebec Easter Riots”. Canadian Historical Review.
(2008) 89, no. 4: 503-540. Vacante J. “The Posthumous Lives of René Lévesque”. Journal of
Canadian Studies. (2011) 45, no. 2: 5-30. Beyond these indirect discussion on Québécois culture and
politics there are several studies that exist in ‘satellite-range’ to the issue. These studies are useful for
supplementing the indirect sources by providing anecdotal or broad discussions about essential
facets of Canadian society (i.e. multiculturalism, federalism, linguistics and pedagogy). While not
directly related to the October Crisis, the views that these studies present facilitate engaging the
topic in unorthodox ways and may be of interest to the researcher: Hugh Forbes explores the effects
of immigration and migration on Canadian multiculturalism and cites the growth of distinct ethnic
groups as a source of ethnic tension, Forbes, Hugh Donald. “Canada: From Bilingualism to
Multiculturalism”. Journal of Democracy, (1993) 4, no. 4, October: 69-84; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
and Calvert Jones examine, albeit in brief, the composition of the FLQ as a functional terrorist
network, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni M., and Jones C. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why AlQaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think”. International Security. (2008) 33, no. 2: 7-44.;
Bourhis, Montreuil, Helly, and Jantzen examine discriminatory practices of minorities and disabled
persons in Québec, Bourhis, Richard Y., Annie Montreuil, Denise Helly, and Lorna Jantzen.
“Discrimination et linguicisme au Québec: Enquête sur la diversité ethnique au Canada”. Canadian
Ethnic Studies. (2008) 39, no. 1-2: 31-49.; Karim H. Karim explores multicultural perspectives
expressed in English language newspapers in an attempt to gage how English Canada feels about
immigration and Québec relations, Karim, K.H. “Press, Public Sphere and Pluralism:
Multiculturalism Debates in Canadian English-Language Newspapers”. Canadian Ethnic Studies.
(2008) 40, no. 1: 57-78.; Dib, Donaldson and Turcotte examine the importance of “multicultural
common spaces” (Dib, 161) and their importance in developing collective experiences and a shared
identity Dib, K., I. Donaldson, and B. Turcotte. “Integration and Identity in Canada: The
Importance of Multicultural Common Spaces”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2008) 40, no. 1: 161-188.;
Brook Thomas provides a general discussion on the exercise of multiculturalism in a broader global
context and within Québec, Thomas, Brook. “Civic Multiculturalism and the Myth of Liberal
Consent: A Comparative Analysis”. CR: The New Centennial Review. (2003) 1, no. 3: 1-35.; Chedly
Belkhodja explores a recent resurgence in Québécois conservatism, Belkhodja, C. “Le discours de la
<Nouvelle sensibilite conservatrice> au Quebec”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. 2008. 40, no. 1: 79-100.;
29
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Unfortunately, none of the above studies directly examine violence and the
October Crisis. This gap in Canadian scholarship bears witness to the fact that
Canadians and Québécois have not learned how to intellectually deal with this
episode of violence. For many people of older generations, the October Crisis can
still reach out to them over forty years of happier memories. This dark time in
Canadian history is quickly shunned and deliberately forgotten.
This
disassociation also illustrates the long-term cost that the use of ‘political violence’
accrues. Violence and its accompanying response is a bitter pill to swallow for any
democratic constitutional nation.30 While it is not surprising that the secondary
literature on the October Crisis falls along pre-determined national and linguistic
lines, it is surprising that the context in which the October Crisis is examined
ignores the role played by violence. The violence itself is either ignored or
dismissed. Interpretations of the event are either sympathetic to the actions of the
federal government and Ottawa, or against them. Some approaches ignore the
FLQ’s part in the affair altogether. The result of this historical disconnect is a
disjointed and incomplete understanding of the October Crisis as an important
cultural event. In order to rectify this shortcoming a new methodology must stare
directly into the darkness of the violence.
Violence and the October Crisis
Violence has always challenged historians. A natural aberrance to violence
is an appropriate human reaction. Our difficulties with violence speak to our
collective desire to live in peace and avoid pain and suffering. This approach is a
noble and worthy undertaking and is fine for politics, but troublesome for history.
Violence, in a historical perspective, could be viewed as a form of communication.
Violence, which does not cross into genocide, serves to impose the will of one

Joseph Garcea draws into question the utility of multiculturalism, Garcea, Joseph. “Postulations on
the Fragmentary Effects of Multiculturalism in Canada”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2009) 40, no. 1:
141-160.; Jean-Marie Salien illustrates several pedagogical perspectives on the Québécois language,
Salien, Jean-Marie. “Quebec French: Attitudes and Pedagogical Perspectives”. Modern Language
Journal. (1998) 82, no. 1: 95-102.; Barbara Dickson responds to Salien’s arguments and emphasizes
the value of Québec French as a regional dialect, Dickson, Barbara. “Quebec French: A Canadian
Response”. Modern Language Journal. (1999) 83, no. 3: 413-416.; and Dianne E. Sears highlights the
tension between new Québécois French and older linguistic traditions, Sears, Dianne E. "Défense de
parler: Language on Trial in Michèle Lalonde's “La deffence et illustration de la langue
Québecquoyse” and “Outrage au tribunal”. French Review. (1995) 68, no. 6: 1015-1021. These
studies vary in usage but enhance exploration of the tensions that encompass the Québec/Canada
relationship.
30
This is understandable since unapproved and unregulated violence is antithetical to the objectives
of forming a stable nation.
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group over another and is inherently communicative in nature.31 The desired endstate of violence is a change in the understanding of rules of governance and the
conception of the state of affairs. In short, in a perfectly just society violence is
exclusively used to maintain control over the powers of self-determination.
Different cultures use violence for different objectives. Violence in the
western world is used primarily to reformulate political systems, capture or exploit
resources, or to eliminate opposing groups.32 The western way of violence has been
used primarily to reform or change fundamental governmental policies both
internally and externally within states. Revolutionary violence has always been
conducted with this objective. The French Revolution, the American War of
Independence and the Russian Revolution all utilized violence almost exclusively to
reform government. In terms of nationalism, violence is an essential component.
Thus, in the western mind the sole conception of political violence is in
terms of governmental change and the utility of this violence is enigmatic to
historians. Many philosophical and intellectual historians grapple with the western
concept of violence; “The assumption that gradual and piecemeal reform had
demonstrated its superiority over violent revolution as a way to advance human
freedom is so pervasive that even to question such an assumption seems strange”.33
Barrington Moore acknowledges that a natural revulsion towards violence presents
a complication for historiographical views on times of violence and conflict.
Furthermore, Moore reluctantly recognizes a utility in violence in affecting positive
change “…the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of
revolution, perhaps a great deal more”.34 For Moore, violence can occur in the
moment or over time and he tacitly implies that less violence is better. However,
this dichotomy presents Moore with a fundamental historiography paradox. How
can a historian write a history about a time of violence, in which governments were
improved (i.e. represented its people and this prevented greater violence) and deal
with the issue of violence? The paradigm is akin to removing a Band-Aid. Should
it be removed fast or slow? What is worse? It is difficult for a group to reconcile
revolutionary violence against the backdrop of forming a peaceful and just society.
This is as much a moral assessment as it is a historiographical one. Moore
is not incorrect in listening to his personal views on violence while iterating
historical viewpoints. However, while western historiography struggles with
31

See Clausewitz, On War.
The concept of violence within this work is almost exclusively discussed separate from nonpolitical criminal violence. Political criminal violence, such as the FLQ proclivity to fund their
operations via bank robbery or other such crimes is understood to be a part of this discussion.
33
Moore, Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the
Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966): 505.
34
Ibid., 505.
32
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violence, as evidenced in the case of Clément’s critique on the War Measures Act,
historians are missing an opportunity to find a greater understanding of our politics
and history. Historians, like Clément, human in their reactions to violence, could
potentially miss the larger opportunity to infer greater meaning into the defining
moments of our history. A new approach to the October Crisis could be found if
Canadian historiography was willing to side-step its reaction to violence, if only just
for a moment, and evaluate the underlying issues.
In the case of Québec, there is an argument to be made that violence was a
natural progression of Québec modernization and was, in fact, inevitable and
necessary. The Quiet Revolution, non-violent in nature, set in motion ideas that
were in opposition to the constraints of the old regime.
Two sets of structural constraints must be overcome by the
nationalist movement to expand its social base [i.e. having the new
middle-class assert its authority]. The first set of constraints stems
from the nature of colonial rule and the local groups which have a
vested interest in the persistence of the status quo. The constraint is
that these groups, politically established or supported by the state,
control the means of violence in the country. The other set of
constraints stems from the preindustrial character of the local
culture and its traditional commanding institutions. While they
accommodate with the status quo, they are marginal to, if not
resentful of, the ongoing social changes.35
Québec was in a state of flux at the time of the October Crisis. The province was
moving out of a period of industrialization into a modern state with a thriving
middle class. Traditional institutions, like the church, were being rejected for more
liberal institutions that promised better access to wealth and decision-making. The
cultural movement modified institutions like unions, media, and more (institutions
that that did not have the barriers to access like government or the clergy) to
facilitate the desired changes. Institutions like government, the Catholic Church,
and large industrial companies were left to maintain the industrialization project; a
project that was willingly accepted by all concerned, “The attack up on the
legitimation of colonial rule as well as traditional social structure is centered on the
positive acceptance of industrialization”. 36 Something else, not the industrial
innovations of the colonizers, was responsible for the perceived inequality in
Québec. Therefore, it was the nature of the old regime institutions and their
legitimacy as cultural artifacts that brought them into direct conflict with the
35
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revolutionary cultural changes. In essence the FLQ and those in Québec who
supported them, outright or not, could no longer tolerate the concept of an
illegitimate government that was not born of the reconstituted Québec culture.
The Quiet Revolution was a cultural revolution that was in hyper-drive, as a
result of Québec’s apprehensive progress in the early 20th century. It was almost
inevitable that the right to commit violence held by the state would be challenged
by the rising anxieties in Québec’s culture. In the classical western treatment of
violence, the violence in Québec is viewed in these revolutionary terms. Yet,
terrorism and smaller scale violence that cannot present a conventional challenge
to the modern state is not well understood within the context of this model. In
order to understand more clearly the interplay between culture, violence and
governance, it would now be beneficial to examine an alternative example of
statehood and institutionalized violence that is far removed from the trappings of
the west.
The Aztec Empire is a long way off, in both time and space, from the shores
of Québec. However, this distance presents an opportunity to analyze violence in a
primitive state. The Aztecs were a violent society. Violence occupied a special
place within their society in spiritual and political matters. Among their most alien
practices the Aztecs fought Flower Wars in which the objective was to capture, not
kill, your opponent in order to hold them for a violent sacrifice, which often
involved gruesome scenes of violence. Violence and human bloodshed was central
to the communicative language that the Aztecs utilized. Their society would
present a challenge to even the most disciplined western historian to interpret.
Igna Clendinnen recognizes this undertaking and opens her book on the Aztecs
stating
My concern is to discover how ordinary people understood ‘human
sacrifice’: their inescapable intimacy with victims’ bodies, living and
dead; how that intimacy was rendered tolerable; what meanings
were attached to it… My interest is not in belief at this formal level,
but in sensibility: the emotional, moral and aesthetic nexus through
which thought comes to be expressed in action, and so made public,
visible, and accessible to our observation.37
The same could be said about those who are comfortable with political violence in
western cultures. In Clendinnen’s view, Aztec violence operated in a manner
similar to a language between close relations. These actions expressed emotions,
feelings and objectives that verbal or even written language cannot. Aztec violence
37
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was so developed that it continued in a cyclical, unaltered, and stable form that it
only finally changed at the beginning of the colonial period with the invasion of
European powers onto their land. Now a reader may question what these two
seemingly separate societies, Québec and Aztec, could possible have in common.
The correct answer would be very little and this is to the historian’s advantage.
Clendinnen’s approach to the language of violence raises possibilities to readdress
how western societies, specifically Québec, utilize violence for the purposes of
political communication and/or control. This is the very essence and efficacy of
the terrorism that the FLQ utilized.
At the most basic level violence is an instinctive action with which all
individuals are born. One of our first acts of communication is crying. These
violent and uncomfortable outbursts are designed to bring attention and remedy to
the most basic of problems. This is stated not to indicate that the FLQ were crying
children, far from it, but rather as humans there is an inherent understanding that
violence equals pain and pain equals behavior modification. It is our most innate
ability that we use to affect our environment, “Crying is not only the earliest moodsignal we give, it is also the most basic”.38 It is a mode of communication that is
understandable across all cultures and linguistic backgrounds. It is no wonder that
when all other channels of communication or petition (i.e. parliamentary elections,
peaceful protest, etc.) have failed, violence, which is always readily available, is
utilized.
As a person ages they increase their ability to communicate in a more
sophisticated manner. The ability to express violence increases as well. The Aztecs
(or Mexica) possessed a high level of sophistication when utilizing violence to
control their populations, “…the Mexica ceremonial extravaganzas staged in the
main temples were dramatizations of a state ideology: exercises in hegemonic
control which had more to do with the politics of terror than with service to the
gods”.39 Human suffering conveys a very clear message. The Aztecs were well aware
that to display power was to perform the ability to inflict pain and suffering and use
this to promote governmental efficacy. As will be explored below in more detail,
the infliction of suffering on the part of the FLQ was intended to undermine
governmental legitimacy.
By these abstract expressions of violence the Aztecs held license over the
very nature of violence. There were even sects within Aztec society that specialized
in the art of pain and violence, “Mexica priests were athletes of self-mortification”.40
These priests brought violence to its full utility in the name of state goals. If you
38
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wish to do violence, it must serve a political or spiritual benefit to the state. The
implications of this imperative are obvious, however, it is useful to restate them to
serve this intellectual exploration; non-criminal violence will be tolerated by the
whole of a society only if it serves the goals of that society. If a society’s goals
become divergent, then violence is an acceptable expression outside of the power of
the state to a minority or majority group within that society. Similar to how the
Aztecs would forbid unauthorized acts of dancing or spiritual violence, acts of
terrorism are likewise forbidden; invoking violence is invoking the power of the
state. In short, violence is the universally accepted means of maintaining and
constructing the state. This aspect of Aztec society is not absent in the western
conception of violence and societies.
The FLQ Manifesto
In the case of the October crisis, the terrorism of the event had some very
clear reformative objectives. Shortly after the kidnapping of James Cross the FLQ
released a manifesto that detailed seven conditions that must be met in order to
secure his release.41 As part of their demands, the FLQ terrorists sought to have
their manifesto read on national television. While Trudeau downplayed the
importance of reading the FLQ Manifesto on Radio-Canada, there was disagreement
as to its impact, “Deliberate or unwitting, [the decision to read the manifesto]
proved to be a major blunder… the manifesto’s impact on the people of Quebec
was impressive. While they overwhelmingly disapproved of the FLQ’s methods,
they vehemently approved [sic] of their aims”.42 The FLQ Manifesto was a successful
effort to create a milieu of violence and political purpose. In this respect the
terrorists had achieved one of their greatest aims; namely that of utilizing violence
to rally the people of Québec to their goals, “Revolutionary violence is nothing but
the organized and conscious violence of a people, a class, a national or
multinational collectivity [sic]…”. 43 This success would not have been possible
without the FLQ’s act of violence. Through violence the legitimacy of the federal
government was, at least ideologically, drawn into question.
Lacking any formal power and the possibility of widespread political success
under the normal channels of government, violence became the only vehicle of
communication available to the FLQ. However, this use of violence did not come
without a tactical price. Going forward the FLQ would have to justify their violent
mode of communication. The Manifesto detailed that the use of violence was
41
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justified as a response to repressive violence of a colonial regime.44 In this way the
FLQ was equating themselves to the governments of Québec and Canada and
characterizing their action as ‘responsive’ in nature justified their existence in their
supporters in the citizenship of Québec. Their violence was justified since it
concerned directly matters of the state and self-determination.
Throughout the Manifesto the images of violence are present, “The Front de
libération du Québec wants total independence for Quebecers, united in a free
society and purged for good of the clique of voracious sharks, the patronizing ‘big
bosses’ and their henchmen who have made Quebec their private hunting ground
for ‘cheap labor’ and unscrupulous exploitation”.45 Sharks, henchmen and hunting
grounds are all nouns that set the tone for the rest of the document. It can be
discerned from this passage that the FLQ sees their actions as a reaction or a
defense against predators who have thrown the first assault. They even state so
explicitly, “The Front de libération du Québec is not an aggressive movement, but
rather a response to the aggression perpetrated by high finance through the puppet
governments in Ottawa and Québec”.46 By the use of this language the FLQ has
indicated how they see the operation of their surroundings and what constitutes
their standard of violence.47 It is worth noting that the original aim of the FLQ was
the worker state and not necessarily separation. The push for language rights
comes later and could be viewed as a tool tapping into larger Québec frustration
over language and federal interference. When this becomes part of their goal the
FLQ gained more prominence and support.
Like most Marxists, the FLQ sees violence in the economic actions of the
capitalists. But the violence that the FLQ sees cannot be remedied by any
traditional action that existed. The FLQ was heartened by the gains that the PQ
made during the election, “but the Liberal victory clearly demonstrates that what
we call democracy in Quebec has always been, and still is, a ‘democracy’ of the
rich”. 48 Note that the FLQ does not criticize the fundamental concept of
democracy, but they do not wholly embrace it either. The authors of the Manifesto
tacitly state that democracy is a legitimate system of government (or at the very least
44
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they do no deny it). Their grievance is that this so-called ‘democracy’ has been
overcome by corruption and influence. It was the “election riggers”49 that won the
election for the Liberal Party, and therefore the self-determination of the Québécois
had not been honored. In a sense the FLQ is seeking to delegitimize the will of the
majority in an effort to justify their will. Though this is obvious, this paradigm is
also not as simple as it sounds. The FLQ disregards those French-Canadiens who
are active participants in the provincial democratic process and while
simultaneously seeking to represent the same people. At the time in Québec, and
even currently, there exists a large contingent of Francophones who wish to remain
in Confederation. Trudeau, Bourassa, and more recently Jean Charest typify these
Canadiens. It was not unusual for the FLQ to dehumanize this section of Québec
society in an effort to dismiss this group as an abboration, “In FLQ circles of the
late 1960s, it was not uncommon to denounce Trudeau publicly by naming him a
‘fairy’ or a ‘faggot’”. 50 Even more ironic was the fact that Pierre Vallières and
Trudeau worked together against the Duplessis Regime in their association through
Cité Libre.51
More to the point, the FLQ wished to reject the traditional CanadianBritish style of democracy as a wholly foreign entity, “we have washed our hands
lean of the British parliamentary system and the Front de liberation du Québec will
never allow itself to be distracted by the electoral crumbs that the Anglo-Saxon
capitalists toss Quebec’s way every four years”. 52 The criticism of the British
parliamentary system is of prime interest within this argument. One cannot help
but wonder what the FLQ’s position on the parliamentary system would have been
if the PQ had won the 1970 provincial election. The implication the Manifesto’s
authors André Roy and Jacques Lanctôt 53 wish to convey is that there is a
fundamental and cultural difference between that which is just and that which is
not. The embodiment of justice in Québec is that which is Québécois, and that
must be so within every facet of Québécois life. As such, ‘token’ gestures by the
Québec government such as Québec’s first language law Bill 63, socialized medicine
49
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and more became not just inadequate choices in governance but anti-cultural
actions that were specifically designed to destroy Québec culture even though these
actions, especially healthcare, leaned sharply to the left. The FLQ formulated their
response around these cultural differences and sought to reject these forms of
oppression, as they perceived it. Their ideology became so rigid and absolute that
violence became a permissible step.
This segue into violence begs a fundamental question about the Manifesto
that needs to be answered is: Could the grievances of the FLQ and the larger
francophone population be remedied in a means that did not require terrorism or
violence? For argument’s sake, suppose that the PQ had accomplished their
objective in the election of 1968 that Québec be declared a free and independent
nation.54 This outcome would prove to be problematic for the theoretical force
behind the FLQ. If the rejection of all things British is fundamental to the
ideology of the FLQ then how can they move forward in a system of power that
they have rejected? For the FLQ, the problem was not the semantics of
government, it was government. The FLQ’s decision to forego the democratic
process thus leaves the violent overthrow of government as the only option.
‘Crossing the Rubicon’ in regards to violence may be an anti-democratic
action, but it is not an anti-nationalist action. It can even be stated that violence is
a necessary action for the FLQ if they seek to accomplish their aim of creating a free
and independent state.
No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism
exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers… Yet void as
these tombs are of identifiable mortal remains or immortal souls,
they are nonetheless saturated with ghostly national imaginings.
(This is why so many different nations have such tombs without
feeling any need to specify the nationality of their absent occupants.
What else could they be but Germans, Americans, Argentinians . .
.?55
The concept of nationalism demands a new spiritual basis upon which to build a
nation. If the nation of Québec is ever to come into being then martyrs, as a point
of reference, are required. This necessitates that the revolutionary be unknown, or
next to unknown, committed, and to have no other option remaining. At the end
of his work, FLQ’s Vallières echoes this sentiment, “My dreams are ‘measureless,’
and yet I am an ordinary man, I think. I cannot ‘live my life’ without working to
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make the revolution, and it seems to me that it is pretty much the same for you”.56
As a Marxist, Vallières rejects the traditional Catholic religion and modifies his
noun and adjective selections to convey a similar level of devotion and urgency;
‘ordinary’, ‘dreams’, and ‘measureless’, all accomplish this spiritual goal.57 Vallières
is aware that violent action has a specific utility and if he wishes to destroy the old
regime it must be utilized in a populous and ordinary fashion. This approach may
be useful in obtaining the new nation state the FLQ so desperately desires, but does
little to advance the nation after the revolutionary process.
As sometimes happens within revolutionary or nihilistic ideologies, there is
a movement and justification to destroy the current system but have nothing to
replace it.58 The FLQ was no different in this respect. Nowhere in the Manifesto,
short of the mention of Marxism, are there suggested tactical remedies to the
problems of governance in Québec. The FLQ expose this dissonance in the
Manifesto as well, “And the Montreal policemen, those strong-arms of the system,
should understand these reasons – they should have been able to see that we live in
a terrorized society because, without their force, without their violence, everything
fell apart on October 7!”59 (Bélanger). The treatment of the police within this
passage presents problems for the FLQ. They recognize that the police are both the
terrorizer and the terrorized. The FLQ is at the same time appealing to the
consciousness of the police while assailing it at the same time.60 There is little
doubt that the FLQ would have accepted and even encouraged an insurrection
among the police. Such access to violence could not be declined but leaves the
FLQ in a difficult position. This contradiction indicates that there existed some
uncomfortable ideological problems for the FLQ, many of which were put aside
until their primary goals could be achieved through the necessary violence.
In addressing the Montréal Police in this manner the FLQ admit that their
desired society will need and should utilize violence; it is the direction of that
violence that is of primary concern. For the FLQ there is no way to govern sans
violence; there is no way to oppose without violence. Ultimately, the FLQ can
neither throw the grenade nor put the pin back in, “On October 7, 1969,
Montreal’s police officers and firefighters staged an illegal strike. The city was
56
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rocked by several hours of violence and mayhem”.61 The police and firefighters
utilized a language that the FLQ clearly understood; agree with our position or find
uncontrolled violence upon you. While the mode of the coercion is not so
different than the modus operandi of the FLQ, the primary concern is the motivation
behind the violence and the degree to which a level of violence serves the objective.
If the illegal strike of the Montréal police had continued on for a longer period,
their message would have changed. The strike would have ceased to be a labor
relations dispute and would have become revolutionary in nature. This potential
for escalation belies the nuances that violence, as a language, can convey. Even
though the respective spoken languages may indicate differently what is actually
occurring in a particular incident, the violence conveys its own meaning. Violence
in this case is a language that is basic enough to be understood by all participants,
yet so unique that no words can match its meaning.
The Manifesto terminates with four lines or slogans that were synonymous
with the October Crisis and the greater separatist movement, “Long live free
Quebec! Long live our imprisoned political comrades! Long live the Quebec
revolution! Long live the Front de libération du Québec!”. 62 Here the FLQ
specifically links their struggle to the earlier calls for Québec independence such as
Charles De Gaulle’s infamous speech in 1967 in which he followed up calls of
‘Long live Montréal’ and ‘Long live Québec’ with “Vive le Québec libre!”.63 De
Gaulle’s proclamation created an international rift between Canada and France,
and propelled the separatist movement into the international spotlight. This step
was vital to the authorization of violence associated with the separatist movement.
The struggle the FLQ undertook was not just a struggle between Canada and
Québec but was also a part of a much larger narrative of nationalism.64 While this
context may be out of the scope of this exploration, it is useful to say that De
Gaulle’s statement brought to light the concept of Québec as a nation. The
61
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violence that followed was an indirect result of that nationalistic endorsement. An
independent Québec is an expression of nationalism; nationalism and the social
change that it demands are either facilitated in moderation or through the rapid
actions of violence, as Moore describes. Nationalism is a language of violence all
on its own and a nation cannot exist without the aid of those who hold the capacity
for violence (i.e. police and soldiers). De Gaulle, a soldier himself, helped to
solidify these motivations in the hearts and minds of the Québécois with a single
word: ‘libre’ (free) and brought the advance modern conception of nation into a
collision course with an anachronism of the early 20th century that was extant in the
legal framework of Canada.
The War Measures Act
It would be unavoidable and irresponsible to analyze the October Crisis and
not include any reflection on the War Measures Act. However, it would be equally
irresponsible to speak of the Act without putting the actions of the government into
the proper context. The period leading up to the October Crisis was one of social
change and turbulence throughout North America and the world.
Canada was faced with two serious ‘political’ crimes, however they
had not simply appeared out of nowhere. Other countries faced
even greater turmoil.
May ’68 had literally shattered the
foundations of France… combined with spectacular political
assassinations–John F. and Robert Kennedy, Malcolm X, and
Martin Luther King Jr.…On May 4, 1970, the United States
National Guard opened fire on a demonstration at Ohio’s Kent
State University and left four students dead. All this happened in
the run-up to Canada’s crisis in 1970 and the people of Canada
were fully aware of these events that were taking place in other
countries.65
Arguably the world had entered into a new phase of social dialogue. Social strife
and transformation were occurring all over the globe, violently in many instances.
As is typical with changes in the social structure of any society there is a lag in the
systems of government and the societies they govern. Indeed, these lags are often
the causes of revolutions (i.e. the rise of the bureaucratic class in pre-revolutionary
France, or the lack of representation of the American colonies in the British
parliament). The implication of these lags in the systems of government is that the
tools that governments have to deal with new social challenges are anachronistic in
nature. This paradigm is akin to the phenomena of modern industrialized
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militaries always being ready to fight the ‘last’ war. Such is the case with the War
Measures Act as its genesis indicates.
Prior to the October Crisis, Canada invoked the War Measures Act
on only two other occasions. The first use was between August 4,
1914 and January 10, 1920. ‘The occasion of the Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia in 1917 was the cause of the passage of a
number of regulations and orders under which membership in
certain organizations was proscribed and individuals were interned.’
The Act was used a second time during the period from August 25,
1939 until 1945”.66
The War Measures Act was gestated in a very different time than the 1970s. The
primary purpose of the Act was to enable the executive branch of the federal
government to deal with the perceived threats to sovereignty of the early 20th
century, specifically the rise of communism and other revolutionary ideologies.67
This alone is evidence of a lag in the utility of the War Measures Act. Historical
scholarship should point out injustices and abuses that occurred under the Act with
the qualification that governments are, by their very nature, reactive in nature and
always prepared for events in hindsight. The War Measures Act was tailored to
another threat and another time. Unfortunately, it was the only all-encompassing
executive power that was available to deal with the unique situation that was
presented to Trudeau and Bourassa in 1970.
Due to the lack of limits on executive power contained within the Act, it is a
reach to expect that the Act could have been used with the requisite temperance
and responsibility that the October Crisis demanded. Trudeau and Bourassa used
the Act, as imperfect as it was, to calm the crisis and these powers were deactivated
when the crisis abated. There is justification to argue that the Act was not
deactivated soon enough, as it was officially ended in April 1971. The replacement
of the War Measures Act with the Emergencies Act68 (albeit 10 years later; again a
reactionary action) reflects this criticism, wherein the Emergencies Act will expire
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automatically after 30, 60, 90 and 120 days (depending on the type of emergency)
without the approval of Parliament.
The War Measures Act garnered the federal and provincial governments
extraordinary powers that included
(a) censorship, and the control and suppression of publications,
writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of
communication; (b)
arrest,
detention
exclusion
and
deportation;…(d) transportation by land, air, or water and the
control of the transport of persons and things;… (f) appropriation,
control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use
thereof.69
Suffice to say the Act is and should be considered an act of violence even if that
violence does not constitute physical harm. Imprisonment, seizure of property and
censoring of speech can be viewed as acts of violence. The police were granted
these new powers under the Act they quickly moved to utilize these new powers.
Within hours, the police mobilized to arrest and detain suspected
terrorists and their supporters. The police conducted over 3,000
searches and 497 people were detained… The average detainee spent
a week in jail; yet the vast majority of them (87%) were later released
and never charged with a crime. Sixty-two people were charged by
January 1971. Within a month, half of them were released and the
charges were dropped. In the end, only 18 people were convicted of
a crime arising from the crisis.70
It is important to note that beyond the powers of arrest, the government was not
authorized to inflict bodily harm and outside the civil unrest seen in the streets, no
citizen in Québec or Canada was killed or severely impaired. Conversely, the FLQ
made no effort to abdicate the power of bodily harm and utilized it often. Between
1963 and June 1970 the FLQ killed six civilians in a series of bombings, raids and
robberies that, sadly, some scholars often fail to mention.
It may also be that there is an uncomfortable acceptance of the violence
perpetrated by the FLQ. During a 1970 call into the English-speaking radio
program Double Take on CBC Radio, a Francophone caller (she remains
unidentified) summarizes the discomfort and her struggle with the use of violence
by the FLQ.71 She commences her call in a calm manner describing her every day
69
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experiences and frustrations under the linguistic hegemony of English within
Québec. She condemns the violence of the FLQ, but supports the contents of the
Manifesto. There is a chilling moment during the call when she admits, that while
she has never been violent in her life, the violence she sees on the streets may be a
good thing, “maybe it is going to shake something up. And maybe the government,
they think ahead the next time they do something”.72 It is an astonishing evolution
of her personal view that takes the listener through a transformational moment.
She has weighed the costs and benefits of the violence against her observed level of
social inequality and her eventual acceptance of violence indicates that social
inequality in Québec is too great to tolerate. This insight illustrates just how
important the concept of language is to the Québécois and may explain why
violence, depending on the source and magnitude, is not always viewed with equal
measure. Yet, this case proved to be the exception and not the rule.
While it may appear that an individual’s perspective of the War Measures
Act is universally determined by one’s language, the reality at the time was very
different “In a Gallup Poll published on 12 December 1970, 89 per cent of Englishspeaking Canadians approved of the federal government’s action in adopting the
War Measures Act Regulations, while 6 percent disapproved and 5 per cent were
undecided. Among French-speaking Canadians, 86 per cent approved, 9 per cent
disapproved, and 5 per cent were undecided”.73 This support for the actions of the
federal government may have waned as the crisis receded into memory. Also the
criticisms of the Act were taken more seriously since the Emergencies Act replaced it.
This poll is more indicative of the fact that French and English Canada, two
societies of the western tradition, while diametrically opposed in their opinions on
the fate of Québec’s institutions, were near universally united in their rejection of
the types of violence in accomplishing these aims. The legacy of the October Crisis
in this respect was a “sad and costly loss of innocence”74, brought on by the killing
of Pierre Laporte, an action that still taints the politics around the quest for
sovereignty.
Why Pierre Laporte Had to Die
On 10 October 1970, Pierre Laporte was kidnapped from his home in
Saint-Lambert, Québec by members of the FLQ. On Friday, 16 October 1970 at 3
72
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a.m. “letters from the government of Quebec and the city of Montreal, requesting
the application of the Regulations under the War Measures Act, are received in
Ottawa by the Federal government. The War Measures Act Regulations are put in
force at 4 a.m. Police throughout Quebec round up more than 250 suspects by
evening [sic]”.75 On Saturday, 17 October 1970, “[an] FLQ note is found at 9:30
p.m. saying that Laporte had been ‘executed’ at 6:18 p.m.”.7677
By taking a step back and regarding the sequence of these events in an
objective fashion a pattern emerges. The respective actions of the FLQ and the
governments involved in the crisis appear similar to a conversation. Each
respective action is tactical in nature. However, beyond their immediate effects
these actions can be construed as argumentative in nature. One tactic leads to
another and each is designed to persuade and/or convince the opposition of their
dominance; which in turn is followed by a counter response or a desired
capitulation. The overall strategic conversation can be construed in terms of social
change and larger socio-political movements. These individual acts of violence
deserve greater scrutiny.
The violent acts described above can be isolated as follows: (1) Pierre
Laporte is kidnapped; (2) the War Measures Act is put into effect; and (3) Pierre
Laporte is murdered.78 Each step is a provocation of the last. Pierre Laporte’s
kidnapping is an escalation of an earlier state of affairs. The implementation of
violence during the Crisis was of great concern to all involved, especially to the
FLQ. The death of Pierre Laporte was especially troubling for the FLQ going
forward and recent attempts at revisionism concerning this fact confirm this.
Former FLQ members are claiming that the death of Laporte was accidental.
Le gouvernement Bourassa le savait parce que la police a
illégalement enregistré les confidences faites en prison par Jacques
Rose à son avocat Robert Lemieux. M. Rose y raconte que son frère
Paul, pourtant condamné pour le meurtre, ne se trouvait même pas
à la maison de Saint-Hubert lorsque le drame s'est produit. Les
ravisseurs étaient sur le point d'évacuer Laporte vers un lieu plus sûr
lorsqu'il s'est mis à crier et qu'il est mort, étranglé dans une
75
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bousculade [The Bourassa government knew (he was killed
accidentally) because the police illegally recorded statements made
in prison by Jacques Rose's lawyer Robert Lemieux. Mr. Rose tells
his brother Paul, however, convicted of the murder, was not even in
the house of Saint-Hubert when the tragedy occurred. The
abductors were about to evacuate Laporte to a safer place when he
started screaming ‘he died’, strangled in a physical struggle].79
In retrospect it in more than likely that this account of Laporte’s death is correct.
The account explains the presence of a pillow in the trunk of the car that Laporte
was found in. It is also supported by the evidence laid out by the coroner’s report,
“[Laporte] succumbed to acute asphyxiation after having been choked by a chain
that he wore around his neck”.80 While it is highly unlikely that any court would
rule that the FLQ were not responsible for the death of Laporte, this account
neglects to explain the note that the FLQ sent to police stating that they had
‘executed’ Laporte. In that note the FLQ describe Laporte as “Minister of
unemployment and assimilation” saying that he “was executed… [and] the
exploiters of the Quebec have only to behave themselves [sic]”. 81 Thus, the
semantics of how Laporte died are nuanced and even more important to this
exploration. If Laporte was killed as the revisionists state, then why was a note
stating he was executed sent? Why didn’t the FLQ describe the death as accidental?
While the answers to these questions may never be known, there is room to
speculate. The FLQ may have been trying to save face. Announcing that they
accidently murdered their hostage would make them appear bumbling and reckless,
losing them support in the process. It may also have been that from their
immediate perspective the death of Laporte worked in their favor. His death could
have been spun as a response to the War Measures Act and the dialogue of violence
could continue.
The FLQ had killed before, so the attempts at revisionism were not to cast
them as some kind of peace warriors. The violence of killing remained in their
toolbox. This reinterpretation indicates that while violence is a useful language
that can be utilized to amplify political desires, the language of violence is
unsophisticated and clumsy. In this instance, the FLQ escalated beyond their
means. The execution of Laporte was too much for most Québécois to swallow
and they lost support. As evidenced by the attempts at revisionism and parsing
related to the execution of Laporte, the FLQ acknowledges that they crossed a line
79
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that would be detrimental to their cause. It could also be that the prior deaths were
perpetrated remotely, by bombings, this tactic depersonalized their victims to the
general public; these victims were simply unlucky and not intentionally killed. It is
one thing to kill a nameless government employee, it is a very different action to
kill while looking into a helpless victims eyes. This time they actually had blood
directly on their hands and it may be that the members of the FLQ and the public
couldn’t reconcile that distinction.
In another respect, assuming it was an intentional act, the killing of Laporte
shows how the supply of resources required to commit violence can have an impact
on the conversation. The FLQ had a limited number of means with which to
commit acts of violence. They were limited to bombing, kidnapping and murder,
and up to the time before the murder of Laporte, all but the latter had been
attempted. Conversely, the federal government had at its disposal any number of
tactics with which to pressure the FLQ. Arrests, seizure of property, soldiers on the
street, military assets and police raids, unfettered access to the media and much
more were available to federal and provincial governments. It is possible that the
FLQ surmised that since the federal government had changed tactics, more
bombings and kidnappings were not going to advance the conversation. With
limited means and no new way to respond to the implementation of the War
Measures Act, the FLQ may simply have run out of options and thus so did Pierre
Laporte.
Cross-Lingual Messaging Model
It is quite possible that, in spite of themselves, the FLQ accelerated a
process that would ultimately bring about their worst nightmare. The FLQ’s use of
violence may have been the exact ingredient required to deny them the sovereignty
they so ardently sought. After the social and cultural strife of the 60s and 70s, the
cultural concepts of self and identity fundamentally changed in Canada. English
Canada began to take interest in how Québec fit into the conception of the
Canadian identity. During the October Crisis, the FLQ found that their violence
gave them a new voice and illuminated a group in Canada that had rarely taken the
national stage before then.
Before the Quiet Revolution there is a clear dominance of English cultural
messaging82 over French. The lack of language laws, the dominance of English in
public spaces and the teaching of English in the public school system all contribute
82
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to this dominance.83 During the period prior to the October Crisis, but post-Quiet
Revolution, the amount of cultural messaging that was being transmitted and
received by the English from French sources remained stable. English Canada was
not listening any more or less to French sources prior to the Crisis.
The revolutionary period was internal in nature and did not engage external
groups outside of the Francophone community in Québec. The Francophone
consciousness had come alive during the Quiet Revolution and limited its
consumption of English cultural media, as evidenced by the increases in French
media sources and popular music (i.e. Cité Libré, artists such as Gilles Vigneault,
and Félix Leclerc). As indicated in Appendix #1, Figure 3, the Quiet Revolution
served more to blunt the reception of English sources by the French population
than increase the amount of reception by the English of French cultural
knowledge.
The actions of the FLQ affected both English and French populations in
ways that had never existed before. The weight of cross-lingual cultural messaging
shifted dramatically before and after the October Crisis and the beginning of the
Quiet Revolution. 84 The English language overwhelmingly dominated cultural
messaging before the Quiet Revolution. This dominance is evidenced by the
growth of English language instruction present in the public education system and
the lack of French language protections. Lack of language protection was the main
grievance of the Québécois population, as indicated by the Francophone caller,
“just one thing so simple as to have French for the province of Québec, officially
French like the other provinces have English”.85 The fact that she chose to call into
an English radio station and speak in a language that she was not terribly
comfortable in is extraordinary. She clearly intends that an English audience
receive her message. Just by the very action of her call shows that something has
changed within the context of the dialogue between the French and English
Canada; this may very well have been the entry of violence into the conversation.
Her selection of verbs and adjectives is also quite revealing. Among them
‘shake’, ‘participation’, and ‘listen’, all indicate that the violence is intended to
engage an English observer to their problems. As appendix #1, figure 3 indicates,
the amount of cultural messaging during the Crisis increased dramatically. The
violence had an effect. English Canada was listening to the grievances of the
83
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Québécois, whether they wanted to or not. If the FLQ had accomplished anything
through their violence it was to underline the social inequalities that existed in
Québec. It is important to note that the issue that took precedence in the debate
between Canada and Québec was not the Marxist-Leninist objectives of some of the
members of the FLQ, but the language and cultural concerns of the francophone
population. While Marxist doctrine may have provided an impetus for members of
the FLQ it was not that doctrine that breached the gap between English and
French Canada.
After the crisis had abated the state of relations between French and
English Canada had been permanently altered. The violence of the War Measures
Act may have also served to create this parity. The injustices that were felt in
Québec were extended beyond those provincial borders into other parts of Canada,
“In Toronto, a local school board considered a motion to ban teachers from
speaking about the FLQ in their classrooms”86 and “Premier [of British Columbia]
W.A.C. Bennett, in a perplexing moment of extremism, declared that the
provincial cabinet had approved a regulation banning any teachers in the province,
including college and university professors, from expressing sympathy with the
FLQ”.87 While Clément labels these actions humans rights abuses (they are more
appropriately called civil liberty violations), they indicate that there is a shared
experience that occurred during the October Crisis. Not only did the rest of
English Canada, as far away as British Columbia, become aware of the social
conflict in Québec, there was now the very real possibility that it would affect them
personally.
In a way, the War Measures Act gathered the Canadian population around
the federal mission and started the conversation about how Québec and the rest of
Canada see their identity. This realization aided in bringing the respective weights
of cultural messaging closer to a state of parity.
Conclusion
Violence is central to the October Crisis and is the main reason it continues
to hold sway in the Canadian consciousness. In societies where the primary
objective of their continuation is the reduction of violence, violence can amplify
minority positions, engage the larger political discourse, and if utilized correctly,
affect change in favor of the originator. There is also a spiritual power to violence
that can captivate, mystify and, transfix the attention of an audience. There is little
doubt that the FLQ was able to brodcast their position, force the larger political
consciousness to engage with their ideas, and affect some kind of change in
86
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Québec. The only question that remains is whether that change was a positive one
and moved the FLQ closer to their goals.
If the originator of violence is to be successful in achieving their goals they
must possess a wide capacity for violence.88 Greater access to a larger variety of
means for violence, translates into more versatility while engaged with an adversary.
However, access to a greater set of means for violence is expensive and difficult to
implement. Police, armies and government-like bodies cost a great deal in terms of
resources. The FLQ did not possess the resources, manpower, or the might of a
military. The FLQ could not compete with the federal government’s greater
vocabulary in regards to violence. Also, at the outset of the October Crisis the FLQ
had more options for violence than at the end. As the crisis went on the federal
government was able to maneuver their resources and stymie the FLQ’s ability to
use more legitimate forms of violence (i.e. popular uprisings). The deployment of
soldiers and increased arrest powers meant that the FLQ could not destroy property
or kidnap officials with the relative ease that had existed before. Only harder forms
of violence (i.e. the murder of Laporte or Cross) were available to the FLQ. While
these means were easier to implement, they carried great risks. However, harder
forms of violence threaten to delegitimize the originator and are antithetical to
their ultimate goals. Both the federal government and the FLQ sought to assert
their legitimacy as representatives of the people of Québec through violence. In the
eyes of the Québécois and the rest of Canada, acts of violence are only viewed as
legitimate if they are done on behalf of the will of the majority, and then only if
they are executed in the softest possible manner; in this case, both progenitors of
violence were guilty of violating the latter. While it could be argued that the FLQ
was acting in the best interests of the majority of Québécois, it was the manner of
their violence that ultimately led to their undoing. In Québec the ends do not
always justify the means. In the eyes of many in the Québec population, the FLQ
had a legitimate goal, but they simply lacked the appropriate capacity to support
that goal.
Conversely, the federal government was acting on behalf of two legitimate
yet increasingly opposed societies, the Québécois and the rest of Canada. Their
greater capacity for violence allowed Trudeau to maneuver around this dichotomy
and support his vision for a unified Canada under a powerful and centralized
federal government. As a result of the October Crisis, the federal government was
also in danger of being delegitimized. After the crisis had subsided, members of
opposition parties (i.e. Tommy Douglas and John Diefenbaker) were concerned
with the wide reaching powers the government possessed under the War Measures
Act. Many members saw this free access to means of violence as not just a threat to
88
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personal freedom, but a threat to Canadian federal legitimacy and subsequently
replaced the War Measures Act with the Emergencies Act. This is why the Act features
so prominently in scholarly works that are focused on questioning the power of the
federal government; the War Measures Act is utilized as a foil to delegitimize the
federal government because of the violence that it grants. This assertion is also
buttressed by the above-discussed attempts of revisionism. The murder of Pierre
Laporte by the FLQ, in the cold manner in which it was executed, proved too much
for the majority of the Québécois and ultimately served to delegitimize the
separatist movement.
The October Crisis left the Québec separatist movement divided and
hobbled. The fact that 86% of the Québec population supported the actions of the
federal government 89 and just ten years later 40% of the same population
supported sovereignty90 is evidence of this division among separatists. The federal
government was also not left unscathed as there were serious questions remaining
about the legitimacy of the federalist project. In all, the October Crisis can be
viewed as a conversation over legitimacy, using a language based on violence, set
against a backdrop two unique cultures that sought the most peaceful means of
obtaining their independent objectives.
Political violence was and will continue to be a reality in Québec politics.
During the most recent Québec election, the PQ victory rally was interrupted by
gunfire, while the assailant “[a] crié «les Anglais se réveillent, les Anglais se
réveillent» [cried ‘The English are waking up’]”.91 While there is a justifiable urge
to dismiss a lone-gunman out of hand, the violence that was displayed is a part of a
larger conversation and should not be ignored. It is the violence with which Henry
Bain chose to speak that is most disconcerting. If anything, his attack on the PQ
coupled with his cries in French (important to note since Bain is Anglophone), is
an amplified scream that is in the same syntax as the October Crisis. Additionally,
in the run up to the recent provincial elections, the student tuition crisis also had a
violent component and the Québec government invoked emergency powers in
response to it.92 As is true about most things in Québec, what is often heard is not
often understood. Likewise, the violence of the October Crisis has much more to
say if historians are willing to listen.
89
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Appendix #1 – Figures and Illustrations
Figure 1 – The Division of Views on the October Crisis

Figure 2 – Distance in Time and Historiography
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Figure 3 – Cross-Lingual Exchanges Between English and French Culture in
Canada

Figure 4 – The Range of Capacity for Violence
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Appendix #2 – Timeline of the October Crisis and the FLQ
February 1963 - Le front de libération du Québec (FLQ) is founded
March 1963 - The FLQ bombs three Canadian Army barracks
April 1963 - The first FLQ manifesto is written
April 1963 - FLQ bomb kills night watchman Wilfred O'Neil, first fatal attack
August 1964 to June 1970 - Four more people are killed by FLQ bombs
5 October 1970 - James Cross (British Trade Commissioner) is kidnapped
8 October 1970 - FLQ Manifesto is read on Radio-Canada television
10 October 1970 - Pierre Laporte (Québec Minister of Labour) is kidnapped
12 October 1970 - The army begins patrol operations in the Ottawa region
15 October 1970 - The army is called into Québec
16 October 1970 - The War Measures Act is put into effect
17 October 1970 - Pierre Laporte is murdered by his kidnappers
3 December 1970 - James Cross is released and his kidnappers are flown to Cuba
Appendix #3 – Transcription of “Francophone caller supports FLQ manifesto” 93
I have a lot of frustrations with [English people] … there are some basic
needs here… and I think that I should be able to live my whole day in French… I
work in French… when I answer the phone, like many other people, I answer in
French… the English people that call them there, they are aware that they are in the
province of Québec that it is French here. They hear the operator answer in
French, they hear me answer back in French and they still talk to me in English. I
insist very much. I get offense because I find to my surprise that about eight
persons out of ten do have some notions of French… but they don’t use it… I am
sick of having to ask all the time of [for] a menu in French… service in French… if
the English listen to the French radio station… they are going [to be surprised]
because most of the population here do not approve of the FLQ, the way that they
are doing it. But they approve of what is in the [manifesto], they approve of the
ideas that they are brining forward… I hear English people they always talking of
law and order and democracy. Well that makes me sick, because I vote once in
four years and I want participation I don’t just want a vote. And the participation I
want, all that is left to me is to go down in the street once in a while because the
people don’t listen. And if I go down to the street like all the people did for the
bill this week… have just one thing so simple as to have French for the province of
Québec, officially French like the other provinces have English. Well, this was
93
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refused to me by my government, you know? And I have never been violent in my
life, but now in the bottom of me I think that maybe it is a good thing, what’s
happening, maybe it is going to shake something up. And maybe the government,
they think ahead the next time they do something.
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